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NOTE
MENTAL DISEASE AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR RELIEF
FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACT: SOME
COMMENTS ON THE LEGAL CRITERIA
INTRODUCTION
In 1956 the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the case of
Anderson v. Grasberg,' the philosophy of which would seek a
radical change in the law of insanity The facts were these A
husband and his wife had owned real property in joint tenancy
The husband killed his wife. The heirs of the wife brought an
action to impose a constructive trust for their benefit upon one
half of the property on the theory that the husband's right of sur-
vivorship was barred by the doctrine that no man should benefit
from his own wrong. The supreme court reversed judgment in
favor of the heirs holding that the husband was suffering from a
mental disease at the time of the killing and that "sufficient causal
relation" was shown between the mental disease and the act to
warrant a finding without further trial that the husband had not
committed a wrong which would deprive him of his right of sur-
vivorship.
As a preliminary to any discussion of a disordered mind in a
legal context, terms must be defined. "Mental disease" will be used
to mean both congenital defects of the mind and those defects
which arise in the rmnd postnatally whether caused by traurha,
lesion, or gradual deterioration. In general, that term will be used
to convey the medical idea of the disordered personality "In-
sanity" will signify that "unsoundness of mental condition" (men-
tal disease) which "with regard to any matter under action, modi-
fies or does away with individual legal responsibility or capacity "I
The test of insanity used by the supreme court in the Grasberg
case is the same as that adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Durham v. United States.3
The Durham case held that defendant, tried for housebreaking,
should be found not guilty by reason of insanity if the jury should
determine that his unwarranted entry was the "product" of a
diseased mind. The factors necessary to a finding of insanity tinder
1. 78 N.W.2d 450 (Min. 1956).
2. Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947).
3. 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
this test are (1) that defendant had a mental disease at the time of
the act and (2) that his diseased mind caused the act.
The effect of the Durham case was the abandonment of the old
M'NaghtenO Rules as bases for determining insanity in criminal
cases. Under the M'Naghten Rules the jury must acquit because of
insanity, if it find (1) that defendant was suffering from a mental
disease at the time of the act and (2) that the mental disease de-
prived him either of the knowledge of the nature and quality of the
act or of knowledge that his act was wrong. The M'Naghtcn
Rules with some variation are presently used in almost every com-
mon law jurisdiction.6 The most significant variation is the addi-
tion of the "irresistible impulse" test which will be discussed be-
low. 7 Only the District of Columbia and New Hampshireg use the
Durham "mental disease test" m criminal cases.
The Minnesota Statutes provide that insanity of a defendant in
a crminal case must be determined by the M'Naghten Rules.0
Because the Grasberg case involved civil law rather than criminal,
the supreme court did not find it necessary to apply the M'Naghltef
Rules. On his appeal, defendant had not argued that the mental
disease test should be applied; the supreme court used it on its own
initiative, 0 despite the expression of legislative purpose in a closely
allied area. The court reasoned that in civil cases the consequences
of judgment are different from those in criminal cases and thus the
statutory approval of M'Naghten for criminal cases was not binding
in adjusting the rights of private litigants. The court then criticized
M'Naghten as too strict and approved Durham as better able to
reflect modem psychiatric theory.
The Grasberg case indicates that the reproaches directed at
the M'Naghtenz Rules by psychiatrists 1 are beginning to have more
than sporadic effect. Whether their effect is good or bad, however,
4. The M'Naghten Rules take their name from the case that instigated
their promulgation. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (1843). The Rules were issued by the judges of England upon the
request of the House of Lords.
5. See Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Crminal Defense 51 (1954).
6. Id. at 51-52 and authorities there cited.
7. Fourteen jurisdictions add the irresistible impulse test to the
M'Naghten Rules. Ibid.
8. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399(1869).
9. Minn. Stat. § 610.10 (1953).
10. Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450, 461 (Minn. 1956) (dissenting
opinion).
11. See, e.g., Zilboorg, The Psychology of the Criminal Act and
Punishment 3-26 (1954); Roche Criminality And The Mental Illness-Two.
Faces Of The Same Coin, 22 U. Chli. L. Rev. 320 (1955).
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has not yet been decided either by lawyers12 or psychiatrists.1 ' This
Note will attempt an appraisal of the Grasberg case in an effort to
demonstrate the benefits and inadequacies of the mental disease test
in view of the traditional legal criteria of insanity The discussion
will begin with a brief outline of the nature, function, and purpose
of the doctrine of insanity. Then the presently used tests of insanity
in the criminal law will be criticized in the light of the discussion
of the function of the doctrine of insanity Following the discussion
of the criminal law, analysis of the Durham rule as it was applied in
Grasberg will conclude the Note.
THE NATURE OF THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
In order to determine a proper test of insanity in any area of
the law the reason for the existence of the defense of insanity must
be recognized. No matter where the question of capacity arises, in
a criminal or in a civil case, the law in answering the question de-
cides whether the state of mind accompanying the significant deeds
of the party should prevent imposition of legal consequences upon
him. In most areas of the law deeds alone do not cause legal con-
sequences." In addition to the actions of the party the law must
find present a certain state of mind, or it will refuse to impose
liability or responsibility
It is thus evident that law regards man as capable of taking
various courses of action when a given set of circumstances pre-
sents itself. Man may choose to contract, to inflict injury, or to
dispose of his property The premise upon which the law proceeds
in requiring a showing of a certain state of mind precedent to its
imposition of liability on an individual is the assumption that men
are governed in their actions not only by mechanical heredity and
chance environment but also by some portion of what may conveni-
ently be called "free will." Free will, though its existence in man
may not actually be provable, is an expedient and necessary as-
sumption in keeping social order.", Even if it be conceded that the
12. Compare Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law" From McNagh-
ten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955), with Hall, Responsi-
bility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917(1956).
13. Compare Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianisn And The Law, 22 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 336 (1955), with Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist As An Expert
Witness, 22 U. Chli. L. Rev. 325 (1955).
14. There are of course exceptions to this statement, such as the strict
liabilit of tort law and the "public welfare" offenses of the criminal law. The
latter will be briefly alluded to below.
15. See Katz, Law, Psychiatry, And Free Will, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 397(1955).
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conduct of man is given origin solely by his heredity and environ-
ment, government may obtain its desired results by thrusting upon
the people the knowledge that the law regards them as having the
ability to choose a particular course of action, and that legal rela-
tionships and responsibilities will follow conscious, voluntary ac-
tion. In this manner one of the environmental factors composed by
the law for the people is the knowledge that chosen action has legal
effect. Even under a philosophy of complete determinism which
regards man as a puppet formed of heredity and controlled by en-
vironment 16 the law may justify its assumption that man's will is
free by regarding that assumption as nothing more than a puppet
string.
Thus the standard of social conduct established by the law is
that certain chosen action will have legal effect. The effect given
is fitted to the purpose that government wishes to accomplish. For
antisocial actions punishment is prescribed'to deter the offender
from repeating his act, to deter others from the same action, to
rehabilitate the offender, to incapacitate him for the protection of
society, and to satisfy the need of the public for vengeance." For
breach of agreements solemnly entered into, enforcement or dam-
ages are demanded to stabilize trade and commerce.1 8 Neither ac-
tions alone nor choice alone will cause the legal effect. The law
requires a showing of both action and choice.
Action is shown quite easily by sensory proof. The showing of
choice, however, is a more difficult matter, since it is not something
capable of perception by the senses. We can only infer from sense
perceptions of outward conduct that choice was or was not present.
The jury is an ideal body to draw these inferences, since it, at
least theoretically, is composed of men who make choice and are
therefore able to recognize it.
Although choice, literally, is either completely present or com-
pletely absent, the law has provided that the mental factors making
up the state of mind in which choice is present in the legal sense
will vary with the particular type of case before the court. In cases
involving major crime the element of choice is designated by the
enigmatic inens rea, the factors of which differ with the crime.1 D
16. Alexander and Staub, The Criminal, the Judge and the Public
70-71 (1931).
17. See Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II,
37 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1264-1325 (1937).
18. Guttmacher and Weihofen, Mental Inconpetency, 36 Minn. L
Rev. 179, 195 (1952).
19. I Stephen, History of the Crminal Law of England 94 (1883).
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In tort cases a showing of intent may be required, or if negligence
is alleged the choice of conduct which is later determined to have
been careless causes liability Whatever the peculiar element of
choice required in a particular case may be, the lack of certain
mental elements, such as volition or knowledge, must be shown if
the actor is to have his action escape the consequences imposed by
the law
The forces which are recognized by the law as capable of re-
moving choice also vary with the particular type of case. Undue
influence over a testator may set aside his will.2 0 In criminal cases
a defendant will be relieved from punishment if he was compelled
to commit the prohibited act by a physical force which he was
unable to resist..2 1 A mental disease which disrupts one of the
faculties essential to choice in such a way that choice could not be
exercised should excuse actions of the actor in both civil and
criminal cases.
INSANITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
The interjection of the plea of insanity may appear at various
stages in a criminal proceeding. Defendant may object that he is
incapable of preparing an adequate defense because of present
mental unsoundness2 2 or that following trial he should not be
sentenced because of his incapacity 22 The most controversial as-
pect of the doctrine of insanity within the criminal law is, however,
the actual defense to the accusation of guilt-that defendant should
be acquitted because at the time he committed his criminal act he
was insane.
In recent years the controversy has largely arisen from the
broadside criticism by psychiatrists of the presently used tests of
insanity 24 These doctors, supported by some lawyers, 25 assert that
they should be given a greater role in the determination of responsi-
bility The range of that greater role asked for has varied with the
asker. Some would go so far as to set up a jury of psychiatrists to
decide the entire question of responsibility 20 The thesis general to
these reformers is that human behavior should be judged by the
20. Atkinson, Wills § 55 (1953).
21. Miller, Criminal Law § 54 (1934).
22. Comment, 27 So. Calif. L. Rev. 181, 199 (1954)
23. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 459-60 (1954)
24. The most outspoken of these is Gregory Zilboorg as he speaks in
The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment (1954).
25. See Sobeloff, Insanity and the Crininal Law" Fron McNaghten
to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955)
26. Smith, Criminal Law in the United States. ii Correction and Pre-
vention 112 (1910)
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real experts in the field, the psychiatrists. They reason that the
mind of man is the proper subject of their investigation only and
that since they have made extensive study of the mind, they should
be given the job of determining responsibility. To gain proper per-
spective in evaluating these suggestions it is necessary to ascertain
the real functions of the two professions involved, law and psy-
chiatry.
Laws of course are by definition the rules that govern society.
The rules of the common law are those that have developed over a
long period of time through experience in resolving conflicts be-
tween public and private interests. Psychiatry is a therapeutical
science; its main function is the curing of present disorder. It deals
with the individual and not with the needs of the whole of society.
Law, on the other hand, though dealing with the individual, must
look to the need of society for a broad system of social regulation in
order to fulfill its function. Lav must establish its own rules for
social conduct. Psychiatry may properly give advice as to who
comes within the law's already established rules of social order, but
psychiatry in its narrow sphere of individualized cause and effect is
not a proper body to dictate society's standards. Psychiatry may also
present arguments for a change in the law's social standards, which
of course should be considered on their merits; but to be acceptable,
these changes must, in the judgment of the makers or interpreters
of the law, reflect proper respect for the maintenance of social
order. The objections made to psychiatry's projected transgres-
sions are equally applicable in the civil law area, but as yet the in-
fluence has been strongly felt only in the criminal law.2 7
The standard for proscription of human conduct which the law
has already developed recognizes that a prohibited antisocial act is
not a crime unless it is accompanied by a mental element, which
may vary with the crime alleged. The element of the mind required
for common law crimes and most statutory crimes 8 is broadly
classed as mend rea, guilty mind. It is differently identified accord-
ing to the crime under consideration, but generally it may be said
that certain elements of knowledge and volition are common to
mens rea wherever its necessity appears. -9
Before elaboration of the discussion of major crime which in-
27. The inroads are most apparent in the field of criminology, where
treatment on a psychological basis has done away with many of our tradi-
tional means of handling offenders. For an excellent criticism of this trend
see de Grazia, The Distinction Of Being Mad, 22 U. Chli. L. Rev. 339 (1955).
28. See Miller, Crimmal Law § 20 (1934).
29. See Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 1011-13, 1022 (1932).
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volves mens rea, some discussion of crime which does not require
a showing of mens rea is warranted by the need for clarity There
are some facets of the law which purportedly do not look for a
particular mental state as a precedent condition to legal conse-
quences. In the criminal law these take the form of "public wel-
fare" offenses.30 Liability for such offenses is said to be strict, it
depends only on the answer to the question whether the defendant
has performed the prohibited act. 31 It is doubtful, however, that
imposition of this form of liability represents a policy judgment
that no principle of justice requires a guilty mind in these cases.
The rationale probably lies in the likelihood that the violator in
fact had a punishable state of mind, the usually small penalty in-
volved, the great frequency of violation, and the expense of judicial
proceedings and difficulty of proof inherent in making state of
mind an element of the offense, all of which because of expediency
combine to override the basic premise that choice is an element of
crime.32 The question of the soundness of this or any other rationale
for the public welfare offenses is not pertinent here, this discussion
will center mainly around traditional major crimes, those which
require the showing of menzs rea as an essential.
The requirement that mens rea must accompany an antisocial
act if it is to be deemed criminal may be restated thus the law will
not punish choices that result in socially unacceptable conduct un-
less in the process of choice the individual has had free range of
selection from the mental factors of mens rea. One who does not
fully choose to perform a prohibited act should not be punished if
the reasons for his punishment33 have been removed by the elimina-
tion of full choice. Those defending on the ground of insanity will
normally be hospitalized until cured if successful, and punished if
unsuccessful. To the extent that the purpose of punishment is to
rehabilitate the offender or remove him from society, the purpose
will be accomplished by hospitalization. If the offender lacks the
ability to choose, he is non-deterrable and punishment for the pur-
pose of deterring him from repeating his offense is senseless. The
purpose of public vengeance or retribution, even if a rational pur-
pose of punishment, cannot justly be applied to one without choice.
While it may be argued that strict liability would provide the maxi-
30. Included are offenses such as selling adulterated food, traffic vio-
lations, and violations of building regulations. See Hall. General Principles
of Criminal Law 281-86 (1947).
31. Miller, Criminal Law 72 (1934).
32. See Hall, op. cit. supra note 30, at 281-86.
33. See note 17 supra.
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mum deterrant to the public in that free choosers might commit
crimes hoping to defend by persuading a jury that they lacked the
ability to choose, the argument seems more academic than realistic.
Traditional concepts of justice aside, it is unlikely that any greater
deterrant would be worked on the public's future choices by punish-
ment of those without choice.
The elements of ine s rea are those factors which the law must
find in the mind of the criminal defendant at the tume of the act in
order to convict him for choice of antisocial action. Exactly what
these elements are has been the subject of definition and redefim-
tion throughout the history of civilized criminal law.34 The present
status of definition finds the courts going from case to case varying
the requirements slightly with slight variations m the nature of the
crime.35 It may be said, however, that viens rea in general means
intentional, conscious volition. The accused must intend the act
and know that its effect will be wrong. For this he must have knowl-
edge of its nature and probable consequences and he must wish that
those consequences follow his commission of the act.30 He must be
inwardly aware of his operations and he must experience the
emotion, sensation and thought normal to mankind when he con-
templates his action.3 7
It has been objected in the past that the law considers the mind
of the defendant as separated into defined compartments, one per-
forming the knowing or cognitive function, another the willing
function, etc.38 Psychiatry considers the mind of man an integrated
unit.39 One facet of it cannot be disordered without having the
disorder affect the rest. In attempting to define the mental elements
which show a guilty mind, however, the law does not propose to
separate one function of the personality from another. It merely
34. See Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Ill. L.
Rev. 117 (1922).
35. See Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974 (1932).36. For many crimes which purportedly require a vicns rea to be
shown, true intention is not an element. Crimes based on "gross" negligence
are of this nature. See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 215-46
(1947) where such crimes are described as actually requiring recklessness.
Recklessness is said to be a form of intention in that the actor knows that
his conduct increases the risk of harm, but he does not desire the harm,
and thinks he can act, despite the increase of risk, without causing harm.
37. Generally these elements of inens rca are established by a chain of
inferences which give rise to presumptions. He who acts is presumed to have
intended his action and the natural and probable consequences of his action.
Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 IlI. L. Rev. 578(1923). That these presumptions are rebuttable is seen from the doctrines of
insanity, infancy, compulsion, etc.




seeks the symptoms that it has through historic development deemed
indicative of a guilty mind. The showing of the lack of one symptom
suffices to excuse on the ground that the mind is not guilty No
compartmentalization is attempted. The law by its analytic defini-
tion seeks only evidence of an innocent personality
The law has long recognized that one of the forces which may
cause the removal of the mental elements necessary to criminal
conviction is the mental disease.4 0 If a mental disease so disrupted
the mind of the defendant at the time of his antisocial act that his
mind lacked any of the elements of men-s rea, he must be acquitted
on the ground of insanity. Within this framework of legal theory the
mind of the defendant is always considered the cause of the act, but
if mental disease has caused a change in the mind so that it can no
longer be considered guilty the defendant is not responsible.
CRITICISM OF PRESENTLY USED TESTS
Durham
Against this discussion of what the test of insanity in criminal
law should be, the inadequacies of the present tests can be pointed
out. The relatively recent test used in Durham v. United States
gives the psychiatrist some of the reform he wants, since it allows
him to give the jury his full opinion about the mental condition of
the defendant,"1 which, as will be seen, is not the case under the
M'Naghten test. It will be recalled that the Durham test excuses
antisocial conduct if the act of the defendant was a product of a
diseased mind. In asking whether a diseased mind caused the act of
the defendant the courts using this test ignore the very thing at
issue according to traditional concepts of what factors constitute
a crime. A showing that the mind is diseased cannot logically show
that the mind is innocent (that mens rea is absent) Something
more remains to be proved. It must be shown that the mind is not a
guilty mind. When mental disease is the vehicle by which a de-
fendant tries to show his innocence of mind, what is actually at-
tempted is a showing that the mind is lacking in the symptoms of
guilt because the intellectual, emotional, and volitional processes
are atypical. But it is only when the aberration is such that the in-
tent, malice, or will of defendant is not manifested in the same con-
scious manner as they are in man generally, that defendant should
40. See Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 123-38 (1925)




be acquitted as insane. Similarly, a determination that the mental
disease affected the mind so as to produce the act does not answer
the question whether the mind was guilty. The objection to be
made against Durham is that it does not relate to the logical struc-
ture of the definition of crime-action plus iens rea. The question
it asks (did the diseased mind cause the act?) is utterly discon-
nected from this traditional framework. Durham would illogically
attempt to set the defense of insanity on a plane with the defense
of innocent mind, when historically the former has always been a
subdivision of the latter. The Durham opinion itself recognized
this problem but was unable to solve it with anything more than an
assertion.
"The legal and moral traditions of the western world require
that those who, of their own free will and with evil intent
(sometimes called inmas rea), commit acts which violate the
law, shall be criminally responsible for those acts. Our traditions
also, require that where such acts stem from and are the product
of a mental disease or defect as those terms are used herein,
moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not be crimi-
nal responsibility." -4 2 (Emphasis added.)
M'Naghten
The major criticism of the M'Naghten Rules lies in their nar-
row substance and strict administration. Some psychiatrists feel
constricted on the witness stand when asked to interpret the state
of mind of a particular defendant according to the M'Naghtan
Rules. They object that they are not permitted by the courts to
explain the full mental status of defendant. In some cases they are
allowed only to give a yes or no answer to the question whether
defendant knew his act was wrong.43 The M'Naghten Rules would
probably be better administered if the experts were allowed to give
full explanation of the defendant's personality before being re-
quired to answer the particular questions concerning knowledge of
right and wrong. Such a procedure would seem to facilitate a more
accurate answer by the jury
Correction of the administration of the M'Naghten Rules, how-
ever, would not eliminate the present inadequacy of the defense of
insanity in the criminal law. The very substance of the rules, is
42. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Here
the court appends a footnote which lends no support to the quoted proposition.
but merely states the fact that those who are found insane may be com-
mitted for an indefinite period to a mental institution.
43. Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hamipslure, 2- U. Cin. L. Rev
356, 357 (1955).
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too shallow to engulf the entire search the law makes for mens rca.
M'Naghten asks only whether the mind of defendant is so condi-
tioned that it is unable to know facts necessary to a finding of
mens tea. A particular defendant may have had knowledge of the
nature and consequences of his act and may have known that his act
was wrong, but mere establishment of those facts will not establish
mens rea. Mens rea as we have seen is not restricted to the cognitivc
capacities of the mind. A satisfactory test of insanity must also
recognize that an ordinarily guilty mind may be rendered innocent
by lack of the necessary volitional factor of mens rea.
Irresistible Impulse
That a mental disease is capable of causing the distortion of the
will follows naturally from the theory of the integrated personality
This realization by lawyers has given rise in at least fourteen states
to the "irresistible impulse" test which is administered in conjunc-
tion with the M'Naghten Rules. 44 This test relieves the defendant
of responsibility if he committed his criminal act upon an impulse
made irresistible by mental disease, even though at the time of the
act he knew that what he was doing was wrong.4" The irresistible
impulse test reflects a realization that the volitional aspect of the
mind may be conditioned by mental disease.
The nature of the will is defined by Webster as "the total con-
scious process of effecting a decision. '40 Volition is the action of
willing, it is the experience of deciding on a certain course of
action. 47 The nature of that experience differs, however, according
to the psychological theory of behavior endorsed. The Behaviorist
theory of the mnd imagines man's actions as a spontaneous reac-
tion to the factors of heredity and environment.4" As such, action
is not controllable by the personality, in a given situation, a given
set of hereditary and environmental factors will always result in
the same course of action. The Mentalist theory of human behavior
views man's actions as controlled by a less definable will. In a
given situation, a given set of hereditary and environmental factors
will result in courses of action which may vary according to the
purposes the individual consciously seeks to effect.4" The "will"
of the criminal law's mens rca is probably closer to the definition
44. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Crimnal Defense 51 (1954).
45. Id. at 52.
46. Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947).
47 Ibid.
48. See Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 95-107 (1925)
49. Ibid.
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of the Mentalist, since that view of the word is predominant in
popular understanding. Men probably do regard themselves as
capable of pursuing different courses of action in given circum-
stances.
If all factors of heredity and environment are viewed as the
stimuli of action, the process of willing is seen as a selection from
those stimuli, and that selection determines the nature of action.
Only those stimuli are operative which enter the consciousness, i.e.
the present awareness of the individual. The subconscious is the
reservoir of past experience and of innate character. Given cir-
cumstances will operate as a conscious factor which call otier
stimuli from the subconscious.
A mental disease may condition the mind so that stimuli which
lead to innocent action are blotted from the mind or stimuli of
criminal action are exaggerated. If the stimuli that lead to innocent
action are removed, leaving only those capable of inducing crime,
the defendant is unable to act innocently. Thus, the disorder of the
will the law must look for is a compulsion to a criminal course of
action from within the mind; the option to act innocently is elimi-
nated because the environmental factors inductive to innocent
reaction in the given situation are eliminated. This theory recog-
nizes that the mind is integrated and that the mental disease is not
an outside force but rather a description of the mind.
While the irresistible impulse test is commendable in its recog-
mtion that disorder of volition renders an act innocent, criticism
may be directed to its manner of recognition. This test pictures the
"impulse" as a force of itself which causes the act. But the mind
is the mover of the body, not some supposed third force such as an
impulse. The mind must give rise to any action taken after presen-
tation of stimuli to the conscious and reaction to those stimuli take
place within the mind. What is probably meant by "irresistible
impulse" is some dominant stimulus of criminal action. If that
stimuluts becomes dominant because of the diseased condition of
the mind, defendant should be relieved of responsibility. But use of
the word "impulse" implies that the ascendancy of the criminal
stimulus must have been instantaneous if insanity is to be found.
Such a test would ignore the major psychoses which produce
gradually mounting obsessions eventually culminating in criminal
action.50 Therefore, by overlooking the possibility that a gradual
50. Royal Commission Report on Capital Punishment 1949-53, 110(Eng. 1953).
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domination of innocent stimuli by criminal stimuli may take place
within the mind, the phrase "irresistible impulse" mispictures the
nature of the diseased will. A proper test of disorder of the will
must provide relief for both the gradual and the spontaneous re-
moval or exaggeration of pertinent conscious stimuli through mental
disease.
Synthesns and Suggestions
A proper test of mental incapacity in the criminal law should be
an attempt to ascertain whether the defendant had the mind of a
criminal when he acted. When it is shown that the mind of the
defendant was diseased at the time of his act the law must yet
determine whether his mind was guilty With each type of case that
arises some variation in the definition of a criminal state of mind
will be necessary in order to match the scope of the search that the
present law makes for mental elements in finding action criminal.
In all crimes, however, which require a finding of mens rca prece-
dent to punishment, a general test of insanity can be given to the
jury This test is based on the theory that some elements of luens
rea do not vary with the particular crime charged.
Defendant should be acquitted on the ground of insanity if the
jury determine from the evidence (expert and other) that de-
fendant's mind was, at the time of the act, in such diseased condi-
tion that (1) he did not know the nature and quality of his act or
(2) that if he did know the nature and quality of the act, he did not
know that it was wrong. In the giving of this test, the search for
mens rea made by the traditional M'Naghten Rules is retained. In
addition to this, a search for the criminal will must be made. A
mental disorder can affect either the stimuli of innocent action, the
stimuli of guilty action, or the process of reacting to stimuli. The
Mentalist's view of the reacting process, which probably would be
endorsed by the law has no exact definition, and for that reason
lapse into less exact language may be necessary under the third
subdivision of this aspect of the test. Semantic shortcomings, how-
ever, are mitigated by the fact that, by hypothesis, the concept of
free will is something normal men understand in reference to their
own choices of action and which, therefore, members of the jury
can recoguize in others.5 The proposed test is
51. The proposed test is framed in the terms used in the development
of the text discussion and is not intended to be the form which jury instruc-
tions would take. The actual instructions should be phrased in non-technical
terms to the extent consistent with clarity, and explanation of technical terms
should be given in the course of expert testimony, or in the instructions or
both.
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The jury must acquit the defendant if it find that at the time of
his criminal act he was suffering from a mental disease which.
(1) removed from his conscious mind the stimuli which the
jury finds would have induced innocent action despite whatever
stimuli of criminal action it should determine to have been
present within his mind; or
(2) exaggerated the stimuli inducing criminal action so
that they outweighed the stimuli of innocent action, or
(3) made him incapable of choosing a different course of
action, even though sufficient stimuli of innocent action were
presented to his conscious mind to outweigh his conscious
stimuli of criminal action.
It is recognized that some would object to this "liberalization"
of the defense of insanity on the theory that liberalization will re-
duce the deterrant effect of the sanction of the law. This objection
is based on the hypothesis that those contemplating criminal acts
will proceed with their plan in reliance on their ability to feign
lack of volition. As indicated above, it is believed that few, if any,
criminals are this calculating. Also, the stigma which (unfortunate-
ly) attaches to one mentally diseased and the prospect of being
committed to a mental institution will, of themselves, have a deter-
rant effect. Finally, if the definition of crime is to continue to re-
quire a showing of nwns rea and the lack of volition is to continue
to indicate an innocent mind, the law cannot refuse the accused the
opportunity to show that he is not what the law accuses him of
being.
CONCLUSION
The Grasberg case is important precedent for a possible under-
mining of the present tests of insanity in the civil law. The applica-
tion of the Durham test to all areas of the law is possible because
of its disregard for the peculiar mental element the law deems im-
portant in each field. The test might easily be rephrased so that
the question asked is "did the diseased mind cause the making of
the will" or "the commission of the tort."
The application of the Durham rule to the civil law is subject
to the same criticism made of its application to the criminal law.
In the fields of torts, contracts, wills, guardianship, divorce, etc.,
the courts and legislatures have evolved mental requirements which
capacitate the party for the act he does, thus giving rise to legal
consequences.52 The mental disease may remove some symptom of
52. Weihofen, Mental Incompetency, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 179 (1952).
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the mind which the law deems necessary in order to give a par-
ticular act legal consequence. But changing existing tests of in-
sanity in the civil law to the phraseology of Durham could only
result in the desertion of traditional law as it has been adapted to
the needs of society
In the Grasberg case the court apparently was concerned with
the inadequacy of the M'Naghten Rules and chose the Durham test
as the only available alternative. The court had to decide the issue,
whether defendant should benefit from killing his wife despite the
equitable doctrine that no man should benefit from his own wrong.
The court began properly by searching for the mental elements of
a "wrong" as that term is used in the doctrine.
"if the killer is found to be insane at the time of the killing he
could not have the requisite intent and the principle of profiting
from one's own wrong is inapplicable. ,,
Thus the court required itself to find that mental disease eliminated
the guilty mind of the defendant before allowing him his full right
of survivorship. But the Grasberg opinion fails as utterly as does
Durham to establish a connection between the mental disease test
and the requirements of niens rea. The majority is quite unclear as
to the device of logic it used to cross the gap between the question
asked by its test and the question whether the mental elements of a
"wrong" were present in the defendant.0 4
Although it is well that the court recognized the deficiency of
the M'Naghten Rules, it is unfortunate that it did not attempt to
devise a test of insanity consistent with the traditional concepts of
responsibility and capacity
53. Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450, 457 (Minn. 1956).
54. See Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450, 461 (Minn. 1956).
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